This paper compares the intra-day patterns on the NYSE and AMEX of volatility, trading volume and bid-ask spreads for European and Japanese dually-listed stocks with American stocks of comparable average trading volume and volatility. It is shown that the intra-day patterns for these stocks are remarkably similar even though public information flows differ markedly across these stocks during the trading day. In the early morning, all stocks have higher volatility than later in the day, but this phenomenon is most pronounced for Japanese stocks and affects American stocks the least. We argue that these patterns are consistent with markets reacting to the overnight accumulation of public information but are inconsistent with the view that early morning volatility can be attributed to monopolistic specialist behavior.
Introduction
Considerable effort has been devoted recently to learning about the determinants of stock return volatility. Trading noise, public information, private information and trading mechanisms have all been identified as potentially important determinants of the volatility of stock returns. To identify the relative importance of these determinants, contributions to the literature have focused mostly on experiments that exploit differences in trading mechanisms, in the arrival of public information, and in whether markets are open. For instance, French and Roll (1986) use the suspension of trading on some Wednesdays in 1968 to compare non-trading days to trading days with similar rates of arrival of public information. Barclay et al. (1990) look at weekend variance with and without Saturday trading on the Tokyo stock exchange to investigate whether additional private information revealed through trading on Saturday affects volatility. Stoll and Whaley (1990) make the case that the opening mechanism of the NYSE increases stock return volatility, whereas Amihud and Mendelson (1991) use the fact that the Tokyo Stock Exchange has two trading periods to argue that higher opening volatility is mostly the result of the incorporation of overnight information. Foster and George (1992) use trading and non-trading period returns of dually-listed stocks and control stocks that trade only in the U.S. to argue that the greater volatility at the open is due to the accumulation of orders at the open. This literature focuses on trading and nontrading period returns because there are no differences among stocks in the arrival of public information during the trading period for the experiments they conduct.
In this paper, we investigate the determinants of stock return volatility in a setting where the rate of arrival of public information differs predictably across stocks during the trading day. We compare the intra-day return behavior during the U.S. trading day of European, Japanese, and American stocks listed on the NYSE or the AMEX. ~ For European stocks, the arrival of public information drops off at the end of the morning in the U.S. as the European business day comes to an end. In contrast, for Japanese stocks, the arrival of public information is uniformly low during the U.S. trading day because the business day in Japan does not overlap with the trading day in the U.S. Hence, using these three classes of stocks, we compare stocks with very different patterns of public information arrival. Since the rate of public information arrival changes during the day across our sample, the sample is also well-suited to study the relation between the arrival of public J In an interesting recent paper, Kleidon and Werner (1995) examine the intra-day patterns of cross-listed U.K. stocks from the open in London to their close in the U.S. to understand better the implications of 24-hour trading of stocks. In their paper, they do not provide the comparisons across classes of stocks with different arrival rates of public information, which are the focus of this paper. In this paper, we treat European stocks as a group and Japanese stocks as a group. Consequently, we do not investigate separately London-listed stocks. The results we report for the European sample are not inconsistent with those of Kleidon and Werner (1995) , though. information, volatility, trading volume, and bid-ask spreads. In particular, the sample is useful to address the issue of whether the arrival of public information leads to more trading, either because the arrivals of public and private information are correlated or because, as in the models of Varian (1989) and Harris and Raviv (1993) , investors trade on public information because it changes their priors differently.
If public information is an important determinant of volatility, one would expect more of the daily volatility of European stocks than of American matching stocks to accrue before the end of the European business day. We find that indeed more of the daily volatility of European stocks accrues during the early morning than for American stocks with similar daily volume and volatility. Afterwards, the rate of volatility accrual does not differ significantly between American and European stocks in any of the four 65-minute trading periods from 10:35 to 14:55, but it differs significantly for the remainder of the day. Surprisingly, however, the cumulative difference in the rate of accrual of volatility between European stocks and the American matching stocks never exceeds 4.5% of total intra-day volatility, which seems economically small. Japanese stocks accrue more of their daily volatility early in the morning than matching American and even European stocks. This is unexpected since Japanese stocks are the only stocks in our sample whose home market is closed at that time. After the first hour of trading, 42% of the daily volatility of Japanese stocks has accrued compared to 30% of the daily volatility of European stocks. American matching stocks, however, accrue significantly more volatility than Japanese stocks from 11:40 to 14:55.
Our evidence raises troubling questions about existing explanations for the early morning volatility. Itis difficult to reconcile with theories that emphasize the role of price discovery or of the NYSE specialist because these theories imply that early morning volatility should be smaller for foreign stocks. Since European and some Japanese stocks trade in Europe, a competing market for these stocks exists when New York opens, so that for these stocks the New York specialist faces competition at the open and his role in the price discovery process is limited. Explanations that rely on private information trading also seem to be inappropriate here since one would expect private information to be more important in New York for domestic stocks.
Our evidence suggests that trading on public information, which has been largely ignored in the theoretical literature, might be more important than previously recognized. To see this, suppose that stock trading is segmented internationally, in the sense that investors trade a stock in their home country if they can. ~ This means that American investors trade foreign stocks in New York if they are listed there. When New York opens, American investors therefore adjust their portfolios based on how the information that accrued overnight affects their priors. Since markets have been open in the foreign countries after the previous close of New York trading, substantially more public information has accrued about foreign stocks than about domestic stocks. Hence, one would expect both more volatility and more trading for foreign stocks in the morning.
Investigating variance, volume and bid-ask spread patterns after the early morning, we find these patterns surprisingly similar across stock classes, so that whether a security's home market is open or closed during U.S. trading seems to have little impact on these patterns. Even though the home-country business day overlaps only partially or not at all with the U.S. business day for the foreign stocks in our sample, investors can infer changes in the value of the foreign stocks from information produced in the U.S. and from U.S. share price movements. Consequently, information flows in the U.S. affect foreign stock prices in the U.S. also. One would expect most of the information used this way to be public information. It may well be that these derived information flows produce similar patterns in variances, volume, and bid-ask spreads for foreign and U.S. stocks. If that is the case, though, it suggests that trading on private information may not be a very important determinant of patterns in variances, volume, and bid-ask spreads since little private information is expected to become known about foreign stocks during the U.S. trading day.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present our data and returns evidence. In Section 3, we show the volatility patterns. In Section 4 and Section 5, we discuss respectively the evidence on volume and bid-ask spreads. We conclude in Section 6.
Data and evidence on returns
The dataset is constructed as follows. Using the 1986 and 1987 ISSM tapes, we select all listings under the names ADR, New York Shares and Common Stocks from countries in the European time zone and from Japan. 3 To remain in the dataset, firms must have at least six trades a day on average, have I00 trading days in the year, and the lowest price in the year must be more than $3. For each foreign finn, we select three matching domestic stocks which have similar trading activity in terms of the average daily number of trades, similar volatility, and trade on the same exchange as the dually-listed share. We drop all observations from October 14, 1987 to October 30, 1987 . The Appendix lists our sample of foreign stocks and the matching stocks. We have 13 European stocks in 1986 and 19 in 1987. There are 5 Japanese stocks in the sample for 1986 and for 1987; of the Japanese stocks, 2 are listed in London in 1986 and in 1987. To investigate intra-day patterns, we treat the opening trade separately from the rest of the day, which is divided in five equally spaced intervals of 65 min from 9:30 a.m. to 2:55 p.m., one interval of 60 rain from 2:55 to 3:55 p.m., and one interval of 5 min at the end of the day from 3:55 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. We consider separately the last five minutes of the trading day since several papers (Harris, 1986 (Harris, , 1989 Wood et al., 1985) show that these last five minutes have unusual return, volatility and volume characteristics. For the opening return, we use the return from the mid-point of the last bid-ask quote on the previous day to the mid-point of the first bid-ask quote. The return for each interval is computed from the mid-point of the last bid-ask quote before the end of the previous interval to the mid-point of the last bid-ask quote of the interval. If the bid-ask quote does not change during the interval, the return for the interval is set equal to zero. If the absolute value of the return is greater than 10% during the interval, it is ignored.
For the variance estimates, we compute the sum of squared returns, Vi,, for each interval i across firms of the same class. 4 For each foreign firm, we compute the sum of squared returns of its matching firms. In this study, we use six different firm classes: European firms, Japanese firms, Japanese firms also listed in London, Japanese firms not listed in London, matching firms of European firms, and matching firms of Japanese firms.
To test for differences in intra-day patterns between two classes of firms, we pair them in the following system of equations: where i = 0 corresponds to the open, i = 7 is the closing, and the variables and coefficients with an asterisk are for the second firm class. In this setting, b E is the sum of the intra-day variances excluding the opening and closing variances. The b~, i= 0 ..... 5,7, coefficients measure the opening, closing, and intra-day variances as a fraction of b e, and the bi* coefficients measure the variance differences 4 We also investigated two alternative measures. In one case, we computed average squared returns. In the other case, we computed the squared return after adjusting for the mean. In both cases, the results are very similar to those reported here.
between the first and the second firm class. This approach is inspired by the work of Foster and Viswanathan (1993) . They estimate intra-day patterns separately for each finn and then derive implications from the distribution of these patterns across firms. The small number of dually-listed firms prevents us from focusing on the distribution of intra-day patterns across firms. Instead, we estimate the intra-day patterns for each class of finns directly.
In estimating Eq.
(1), we use the generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure of Hansen (1982) . GMM estimates are robust in the presence of cross-correlations and serial correlations, attributes that we would expect our data to have. We impose the following orthogonality conditions:
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To estimate b, the vector of 16 unknown b i coefficients, we minimize the quadratic form of g' Wg, where W, a symmetric weighting matrix, is a consistent estimator of the inverse of the asymptotic covariance matrix of T1/2gr(b) , where is the estimate of b, after adjusting for serial correlation as suggested by Newey and West (1987) . While the system is just identified and our GMM estimates coincide with those of ordinary least-squares, our standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
With b as the vector of estimates of b i, and 6 r as the consistent estimator of
we have
We test for significance of the estimates using this covariance matrix. Volume for an intra-day interval refers to the normalized number of shares traded during that interval. We first calculate the number of shares traded over each interval. We then compute the firm average across all intervals and all days. To obtain the normalized volume during an interval, we divide the number of shares traded over that interval by the firm average, and take the average across firms for the interval. To test for significance, we estimate Eq. (1) using the volume instead of the squared returns.
The bid-ask spread is measured as a percent of the bid-ask mid-point. It is observed at the market open and at the end of each interval. We then estimate Eq.
(1) using the bid-ask spreads, but the estimated coefficients are scaled so that they can be interpreted as the bid-ask spread in an interval as a fraction of the bid-ask spread during the third trading interval (11:40-12:45) .
Although this study focuses on the volatility, volume, and bid-ask intra-day patterns, we present evidence on the intra-day returns patterns in Table 1 and Fig.  1 for the sake of completeness. The t-statistics are obtained using the GMM approach discussed above. Intra-day returns follow a U-shaped pattern for all stocks similar to the one documented previously by Harris (1986) . As evidenced by the last column of the table, closing returns are positive as documented in previous papers. The closing returns are five-minute returns. The closing returns are large for both domestic and foreign stocks. These results reinforce the result that the intra-day patterns of domestic and foreign stocks trading in New York are very similar. Both European and Japanese stocks have a significant and large overnight return. All stock groups have significant returns over the last two intervals. In contrast, the other intra-day returns are insignificant except for the return for European stocks in the first interval. Looking at the difference in returns between firm types, we find that European stocks have significantly higher returns in the second interval (which corresponds to the close in some European markets), the fifth interval and the sixth interval. In contrast, they have a significantly lower return in the first trading interval. Japanese stocks have a significantly higher return than their matching stocks in the sixth interval and have a significantly lower return in the second interval. We investigated, but do not report here, the difference in returns between Japanese stocks listed in London and those that are not. We found no significant differences.
Intra-day volatility patterns
Intra-day volatility patterns have previously been studied for U.S. stocks with the database we use. Wood et al. (1985) and McInish and Wood (1990) , using minute by minute transactions data, show a U-shaped pattern for intra-day volatility. Harris (1986) also documents a strong U-shaped pattern for intra-day volatility using 15-minute returns. Finally, Foster and Viswanathan (1993) present results that are comparable to our study. They investigate the intra-day volatility for three groups of stocks. They divide the sample of NYSE stocks on the ISSM database that meet certain selection criteria into deciles of trading activity and select 20 stocks in the first, fifth and tenth deciles. They show that, for all three groups, there is significant intra-day variation in volatility, with volatility being the highest during the first half-hour of trading. For the first and tenth deciles, the coefficient estimates of regressions similar to Eq. (1) show a distinct U-shaped pattern, but no such pattern is present for the fifth decile. Table 2 presents our coefficient estimates of Eq. (1). The results for European stocks are given in panel A. The estimates give the normalized variance for an interval, defined as a fraction of the total intra-day variance (ignoring the opening and closing variances). It is immediately apparent that the variance fractions follow a U-shaped pattern during the day and this is confirmed in Fig. 2 . As expected, the opening variance has the highest fraction and the fractions decline thereafter until the interval from 12:45 to 1:50. After this period, the fractions increase again. The same pattern holds for the domestic comparison stocks.
Looking at the difference between the European and the domestic comparison stocks, the volatility patterns of these two categories of stocks differ significantly only in the first and the last two intervals. In the first interval, the normalized volatility of the European stocks is higher than that of the American stocks; this is reversed gradually over the day. Taking the first three intra-day intervals together and the last three intra-day intervals together, the ratio of morning normalized volatility to afternoon normalized volatility is significantly greater for European stocks than for matching American stocks. The difference in the accrual of volatility during the day seems small if one believes that the accrual of information during the day is substantially more important for American stocks. To see
this, note that in the first trading interval, only 3.3% more of their daily volatility accrues to European stocks than to American stocks; in the interval prior to the close, 2.7% less of their daily volatility accrues to European stocks than to American stocks. Over the four trading intervals in the middle of the day, almost the same fraction of total daily volatility accrues to both European and American stocks (0.568 versus 0.575, respectively) even though one would expect more public information to accrue to American stocks during those intervals than to European stocks. In contrast, there is a substantial difference in normalized volatility for the last two intervals: for the last intra-day period and the closing period, matching stocks have a significantly higher normalized volatility than European stocks. In panel B of Table 2 and in Fig. 2 , we present evidence for the Japanese stocks. Fig. 2 shows that the volatility of the Japanese stocks exhibits a U-shaped pattern like the European stocks. Panel B of Table 2 shows that the volatility of Japanese stocks during the U.S. trading day is much smaller than the volatility of European stocks. One is tempted to explain this by the fact that European stocks trade on their home market in the morning in the U.S. Paradoxically, the accrual of the Japanese daily volatility is concentrated in the morning. The Japanese stocks have a much higher fraction of their total intra-day volatility during the first interval, even though, in contrast to the European and American stocks, their home business and trading days are over. As a result, Japanese stocks have significantly higher normalized volatility than their comparison group during the first interval. In contrast, the comparison group has significantly higher normalized volatility over the third, fourth and fifth intra-day intervals. There is no significant difference in the normalized volatility during the last two intra-day intervals. The volatility patterns between Japanese and U.S. stocks appear to be more different than those between European and U.S. stocks. Finally, for the Japanese stocks, the differences in normalized volatility are more economically significant: the fraction of intra-day volatility that accrues to Japanese stocks in the first period of trading is almost 50% higher than the fraction that accrues to the comparison group of American stocks. Table 3 provides a measure of how volatility accrues during the trading day. Note that the intra-day total volatility excludes the opening and closing volatilities. Panel A shows that a significantly larger cumulative fraction of total daily volatility has accrued for European stocks by 10:35 than for their matching stocks. The gap in volatility accrual existing at 10:35 grows over the next two trading periods and then becomes smaller, but only very slowly, until 2:55.4/5th of the gap existing at 10:35 gets resorbed over the last intra-day trading period. Panel B shows that the fraction of total daily volatility that has accrued for Japanese stocks in excess of their comparison group during the first interval is four times higher than the fraction of total daily volatility that has accrued to European stocks in excess of their comparison group. Yet, the excess volatility accrual of Japanese stocks early in the morning dissipates faster than for the European stocks: by 2:55, this excess volatility accrual becomes insignificantly different from zero.
There are several possible explanations for the evidence we uncover in Tables 2  and 3 . First, following Amihud and Mendelson (1991) , one could argue that opening prices are noisy estimates of public information, so that the first hour of trading incorporates public information that was already available at the opening into prices. Since the Japanese business day closes after the end of the Japanese trading day, Japanese public information accrues after the close of the trading day in Japan. For stocks not listed in Europe, this information can only be incorporated into prices when the NYSE opens. In contrast, for stocks listed in Europe, there is trading when the NYSE opens, so stock prices provide more precise estimates of the existing public information. The price discovery hypothesis suggests that morning volatility accrual should be less for the stocks listed in London. We investigated this hypothesis by dividing the Japanese stocks into stocks listed in London and stocks not listed in London, but do not report the detailed results. In the first trading period, there is no difference between the two groups, whereas in the second period, London-listed stocks have higher normalized volatility than non-London-listed stocks. This evidence does not support the price discovery hypothesis. The second trading period corresponds to the London close; hence, the Japanese stocks listed in London have an increase in volatility around the London close, so that their intra-day volatility in the U.S. inherits both the U-shaped pattern of London stocks and the U-shaped pattern of U.S. stocks. In contrast, but similar to Kleidon and Werner (1995) , panel A of Table 2 shows that the European stocks do not exhibit such a significant increase in volatility at the close of the European markets. Although the New York specialist does not have a monopoly position at the opening for European stocks and for Japanese stocks listed in London, the higher first period normalized volatility can be attributed to specialist behavior only if one believes that American investors would not always switch to the foreign market to avoid specialist rent-seeking. Whereas such a view is plausible given the higher transaction costs abroad, one would still expect to observe greater volatility for domestic stocks for the simple reason that there are fewer alternatives for investors wishing to trade domestic stocks than for investors wishing to trade foreign stocks. Hence, it is hard to view our evidence as supportive of the argument advanced by Stoll and Whaley (1990) .
It could well be that the massive overnight arrival of public information for foreign stocks is accompanied by an equally massive arrival of short-lived private information. If this were the case, one would expect investors to trade on this private information early in the day. With this view, though, one would expect the volatility increase to be smaller for Japanese stocks traded in London than for Japanese stocks not traded in London simply because some of the private information will be traded upon in London. As explained above, this is not the case.
The final explanation we consider is inspired by the trading models of Varian (1989) and Harris and Raviv (1993) . In these models, investors trade on public information because new information leads them to change their priors. Hence, American investors in Japanese or European stocks trade on the overnight public information as the New York market opens if there is segmented trading. Since we do not assume that these investors have valuable private information which would be lost if they did not trade before New York opens, one would not expect them to use the London market. Since London trading does not reflect how American investors react to overnight public information, the lack of a volatility difference in the first period of trading between Japanese stocks listed in London and those which are not is not inconsistent with our explanation. If our explanation is correct, though, one would expect more trading early in the morning for foreign stocks. We turn to a comparison of intra-day patterns in volume next.
All the above analysis is done by computing returns using the mid-point between the bid and ask quotes. We interpret this mid-point as the efficient market price, so that changes in that mid-point correspond to the incorporation of new information into prices. It could be, though, that the mid-point moves around because of microstructural considerations, such as inventory concerns. This raises the question of whether these concerns could make our inferences from the data invalid. One approach would be to follow the time-series analysis of Hasbrouck (1991) and allow explicitly for a transitory component in the mid-point of the bid-ask quote. Instead, we investigated the robustness of our inferences using transaction prices but do not report these results here. The results we emphasize in this paper hold equally if we use transaction prices instead of mid-points between bid and ask prices. Jain and Joh (1988) report the hourly trading volume of the NYSE and demonstrate a U-shaped pattern in trading volume during the day. Foster and Viswanathan (1993) examine the intra-day volume pattern for their three categories of stocks. They find intra-day differences in volume for all deciles, but the differences are most pronounced for the most actively traded stocks. For all deciles, though, the intra-day pattern has a U-shape with volume highest in the first half hour, falling until the fourth hour and then increasing again. The highest volume coincides with the highest variance, which is supportive of the model of concentrated trading of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) . Foster and Viswanathan (1993) investigate formally the relation between the regression coefficients of the volume regressions and of the volatility regressions. For deciles one and ten they find a significant positive relation between the coefficients of the two regressions. Table 4 and Fig. 3 , we present our results for the intra-day variation in normalized volume. In panel A, we show the results for the European stocks. It is immediately clear that these stocks exhibit a U-shaped intra-day pattern and this is shown in Fig. 3 . There seems to be some difference in the intra-day patterns between American and European stocks: European stocks have significantly more of their daily volume in the morning, American stocks have significantly more in the afternoon, except in the last period. The difference in volume is especially striking in the first period where the normalized volume of European stocks is a filth higher than the normalized volume of the matching stocks and in the fourth period where the normalized volume of European stocks is almost a fifth lower than the normalized volume of matching stocks. To investigate turther the concentration of trading, we compute Herfindahl indices as the sum of the squared volume accrual rates. This index would take a value of one if all trading is concentrated in one period and a value of 1/6 if trading takes place equally in each period. The Herfindahl index is 0.180 for European stocks and 0.17[ tbr American matching stocks. Hence, both European and American stocks seem to have equally concentrated trading when measured this way. We saw in Table 2 that the normalized variance of European stocks exceeds the normalized variance of American comparison stocks by 3.3% of total intra-day variance during the first trading interval; during that interval, there is a similar normalized volume difference of 4.8%. Whereas European stocks have significantly higher volume in the morning, they have significantly lower volume in the afternoon except during the five minutes closing trading period where European stocks have significantly higher volume than matching stocks by 0.7%.
Intra-day patterns in volume
Panel B of Table 4 provides results for the Japanese stocks. For these stocks, we again observe a U-shaped pattern which is also apparent in Fig. 3 . This pattern is more pronounced than for American matching stocks: a higher fraction of Japanese stock trading accrues in the first and last trading intervals than for American stocks. For both the Japanese and matching American stocks, the fraction of daily volume which accrues during the last two intervals is roughly comparable to the fraction of daily volume which accrues during the first interval. The higher end-of-day volume of the Japanese stocks is not accompanied by higher volatility. Except for the last interval, though, Japanese stocks have greater volatility when they have greater volume. The differences in volume are smaller in magnitude than the differences in volatility. For example, the fraction of volume that accrues to Japanese stocks in excess of the fraction of volume that accrues to American stocks during the first interval is only 5.4% of the daily total in contrast to 13.4% for the variance as shown in Table 2 . The small differences explain why the Herfindahl index for trade concentration of Japanese stocks, 0.183, is so close to the one for matching American stocks, 0.173. As for the comparison with European stocks, the Japanese stocks have lower normalized volume each period from 10:35 to 2:55 and higher normalized volume in the first and last two intervals. O~ .~.~ Table 5 provides results on cumulative intra-day volume. It shows that the normalized volume of American stocks catches up with the normalized volume of Japanese stocks more quickly during the day than it catches up with the normalized volume of European stocks. By 1:50, the accrual of daily volume for American comparison stocks is approximately equal to that for Japanese stocks; for European stocks, this occurs after 2:55. This evidence is consistent with the view that investors receive more information to trade upon late in the morning for European stocks than for Japanese stocks.
The private information story would suggest more accumulation of volume early in the day for Japanese stocks which do not trade on the London Stock Exchange. In panels C of Tables 4 and 5, we report some evidence that (l) Japanese stocks listed in London trade more at the open and (2) volume accumulates faster after the opening for Japanese stocks not listed in London. Interestingly, the greater normalized volume at the open for London-listed stocks is approximately offset by the lesser normalized volume of these stocks during the first two trading intervals. Hence, availability of the London market does lead to a shift in trading towards the open. The volume results contrast with the variance results since, as discussed in the previous section, there is no significant difference in variance accrual rates between Japanese stocks listed in London and those that are not. Hence, one can interpret this evidence as indicating that investors are more willing to trade at the open when a competing exchange is open. Two possible reasons for this are: (a) opening prices are less noisy or (b) trading is cheaper because of competition. Given that the rate of volatility accrual for Japanese stocks not listed in London is not higher following the open, it is hard to argue that the data is supportive of (a). To investigate (h), we have to look at bid-ask spreads, which we do next.
Bid-ask spread intra-day patterns
We now turn to a comparison of the bid-ask intra-day patterns. Existing evidence for American stocks documented in McInish and Wood (1992) , Hasbrouck (1991) and Foster and Viswanathan (1993) indicates that there is a U-shaped pattern in bid-ask spreads. Foster and Viswanathan show that there are significant differences in adverse selection costs during the day, but that these differences are hard to reconcile with models of concentrated trading which suggest that the bid-ask spread should be lower when trading is highest. Their evidence is stronger for the most actively traded firms, however.
In Table 6 , we provide our evidence on intra-day patterns in bid-ask spreads. In panel A, we report the results for European stocks. At the open, the spread for European stocks is 1.04%, which is much lower than the 1.13% for the matching stocks. At the open, however, the normalized spread for European stocks, i.e., the spread divided by its midday value, is significantly higher than for American
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stocks: 164% versus l 11%. Hence, the existence of a competing market for the European stocks does not imply a smaller spike in spread in the morning, which makes it hard to explain this spike by the monopolist behavior of NYSE specialists. The normalized spread for European stocks tends to fall throughout the day. Except for the open, the normalized spread for European stocks is never significantly greater than for matching stocks and is significantly lower in the last two periods. Consequently, as shown in Fig. 4 , European stocks do not exhibit a U-shaped pattern of bid-ask spreads. The matching stocks do not exhibit much of a U-shaped pattern either: the bid-ask spread of matching stocks at the end of the day is not significantly higher than the bid-ask spread at midday. Panel B of Table 6 and Fig. 4 provide evidence for Japanese stocks. Again, for these stocks the bid-ask spread at midday is far lower than for the matching stocks. Similarly to the European stocks, however, the normalized spread for Japanese stocks is higher at the open than for their matching stocks. Contrary to the European stocks, though, the bid-ask spread for Japanese stocks at the end of the day is not significantly lower than at midday. There is no evidence that competition by foreign markets eliminates the bid-ask spread peak in the morning. The absence of a higher normalized bid-ask spread at the end of the day cannot be attributed to competition since foreign markets are closed at that time. Further, in our sample, the behavior of the Japanese stocks at the end of the day is not different from their matching stocks. It is difficult to believe that the greater normalized spread of foreign stocks early in the morning reflects greater adverse selection than later in the day. This is because, presumably, private information trading is more likely to take place on the deeper home market of a security and during the foreign business day. It may well be, though, that in the morning, as American investors react to overnight public information, there is a substantial risk for the specialist of large changes in his inventory resulting from changes in the American investors' demand for foreign securities. The specialist would protect himself from such changes by posting a greater bid-ask spread relative to the rest of the day.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we investigate the intra-day volatility, volume, and bid-ask spread patterns for stocks that differ markedly in the arrival rate of public information. We find that, in spite of the differences in the arrival rate of public information, all groups of stocks have U-shaped patterns of volume and volatility. The U-shaped patterns in volatility cannot be explained by the contemporaneous arrival of public information for the different stocks. Models with trading on private information do not seem to be consistent with our results. This is because, for Japanese stocks, one would expect volatility to be less for the stocks listed in London than for the other stocks if private information is a major determinant of volatility because investors with private information presumably take advantage of the opportunity to trade in London. We find no support for this.
A plausible story for our results is that investors in the U.S. trade on the basis of the accumulated stock of public information since the last closing of the U.S. markets. This stock of information is the largest for Japanese stocks since a whole business day takes place between their close and U.S. open, the second largest for European stocks since more than half a business day takes place between their U.S. close and the open, and smallest for American stocks. With this view, investors trade on the public information because it changes their priors. The process of demand revelation causes prices to exhibit greater volatility. Consequently, the opening price is not a noisy estimate of the fundamentals known at the open; rather, the demand by American investors is revealed only over time as they react to the accumulated public information. The volatility of matching American stocks is lower in the morning because not much has happened to change investors' priors. Bid-ask spreads are larger in the morning for foreign stocks relative to later in the day because there is more uncertainty about demand.
For each foreign stock in the sample and its three American matching stocks, this Appendix provides the ticker symbol, the firm name, the CUSIP number, the number of trading days for the year, the average number of trades per day (NTPD), the standard deviation of hourly returns, the firm size in units of $1000 (the average price for the year times the number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the year), the exchange where the stock is listed at the end of the year (N denotes NYSE and A denotes AMEX), and the lowest price for the year.
A.1. European Stocks Listed on NYSE / AMEX in 1986
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